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1. Introduction 
Large scale disasters1 affect millions of people each year. In the decade between 2004 and 
2014 alone, a number of major disasters took place, including the Indian Ocean tsunami 
(2004), hurricane Katrina (USA, 2005), cyclone Nargis (Myanmar, 2008), typhoon Haiyan 
(Philippines, 2013), a major earthquake in Haiti (2010), and a major earthquake and tsunami 
in Japan (2011), not to mention the countless floods and cyclones that regularly affect states 
every year. These are only a few examples of sudden-onset disasters. Slow-onset disasters, 
such as droughts and desertification, are also numerous.  
Historically, the international law that applies during and in the immediate aftermath of a 
disaster has been a patchwork of norms rather than a coherent body of law. The field of 
disaster response law does not benefit from any overarching instruments akin to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in international human rights law, or the Geneva 
Conventions and Additional Protocols in international humanitarian law. Instead, it is made 
up of subject-specific treaties; disaster-specific treaties; regional, sub-regional, and bilateral 
treaties; and a host of soft law instruments. This piecemeal approach is the subject of Part 2. 
Since the 2000s, there have been concerted efforts to develop a holistic body of international 
law that protects persons in time of disaster, focusing in particular on the international law 
relating to disaster relief. The work has been undertaken primarily by the International Law 
                                                          
* Professor of Public International Law, University of Nottingham. I am grateful to Giulio Bartolini, Therese 
O’Donnell, Fernando Lusa Bordin, Arnold Pronto, and Sarah Williams for comments on earlier drafts of this 
Article. 
1 For the purposes of this paper, the International Law Commission’s definition of a disaster will be used, 
namely ‘a calamitous event or series of events resulting in widespread loss of life, great human suffering and 
distress, mass displacement or large-scale material or environmental damage, thereby seriously disrupting the 
functioning of society.’ ILC Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, Article 3(a), in 
Report of the International Law Commission: Sixty-eighth Session (2 May-10 June and 4 July-12 August 2016), 
A/71/10 (2016), at 30.    
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Commission (ILC), with its preparation of draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the 
Event of Disasters, and by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies (IFRC), with its work on international disaster relief law. The ILC has adopted a set 
of draft Articles and recommended to the UN General Assembly that a convention be 
elaborated on the basis of the draft Articles. In this way, a treaty of global application would 
come into being. For its part, the IFRC has drawn up Guidelines and a Model Act, which it 
hopes will be used by states at the domestic level. In this way, a consistent body of law would 
be created, across states, albeit at the domestic level.  
Part 3 analyses the attempts to develop this holistic body of law and identifies three 
techniques used by the ILC and IFRC to do so. The first technique involves the development 
of a generalized multilateral standard, that is to say a multilateral standard that is developed 
through extrapolation from piecemeal standards. A second technique is the use of analogy, 
where one body of law is developed by analogy to another, related body of law. The third 
technique relates to the form-substance-authority nexus. It is evident in the creation of an 
instrument that is soft in form but which comprises a mixture of lex lata and lex ferenda. In 
such an instrument, a particular norm tends not be identified as lex lata or lex ferenda and the 
two are not separated out from one another. Even though it is soft in form, the instrument can 
have considerable authority. 
The Article explores each of these techniques in the disaster law context and in international 
law generally. It draws on the use of extrapolation in international investment law, which has 
developed as a system of law largely through numerous consistent bilateral treaties. It 
analyses the use of analogy in international humanitarian law and in the development of the 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. And it explores the form-substance-authority 
nexus in the context of the ILC’s Articles on state responsibility. Finally, the Article subjects 
each of the techniques to critical analysis, discussing the limitations on their use in 
developing a holistic body of international law relating to disaster relief.  
Accordingly, the Article offers three principal contributions. First, it traces the emergence of 
an international law of disaster relief. Second, it identifies and analyses the techniques that 
have been used to develop that body of law and assesses the merits and limits of the 
techniques. Third, given that the techniques are used also in other branches of international 
law, it offers insights into the making and shaping of international law more broadly. 
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2. International Law relating to Disaster Relief: A Piecemeal Approach 
The international law regulating the provision of disaster relief is not governed by a grand 
overarching treaty, but by subject-specific and disaster-specific treaties, regional and sub-
regional agreements, as well as a significant number of bilateral agreements and soft law 
instruments.2 Indeed, disaster relief law has been described as being composed of a ‘pot 
pourri’ of, or ‘strewn with’, instruments,3 all of which tend to regulate the same sorts of 
issues.  
A. Multilateral (Global) Treaties 
A number of multilateral treaties exist in the area of disaster relief. However, they regulate 
the response either to specific types of disasters or to particular aspects of disasters. Certain 
treaties regulate assistance in the case of particular types of disasters – nuclear accidents,4 oil 
pollution,5 and so on. Other treaties relate to the provision of specific types of assistance in 
the case of a disaster, for example telecommunications assistance,6 and civil defence 
assistance.7 Others yet concern disasters that take place in particular locations, such as 
transboundary watercourses.8  
A number of conventions of more general applicability contain specific provisions that relate 
to disaster relief, in particular regarding modalities of delivering the assistance. For example, 
as its name suggests, the International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization 
of Customs Procedures (as amended) is intended to simplify and harmonize customs 
                                                          
2 See generally IFRC, Law and Legal Issues in International Disaster Response: A Desk Study (2007); de 
Guttry, ‘Surveying the Law’, in A. de Guttry, M. Gestry and G. Venturini (eds), International Disaster 
Response Law (2012). 
3 See, respectively, Allan and O’Donnell, ‘A Call to Alms?: Natural Disasters, R2P, Duties of Cooperation and 
Unchartered Consequences’, 17 Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2012) 337, at 345; JB Heath, ‘Disasters, 
Relief, and Neglect: The Duty to Accept Humanitarian Assistance and the Work of the International Law 
Commission’, 43 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics (2011) 419, at 447. 
4 Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency 1986. 
5 In particular the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation 1990. 
6 Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief 
Operations 1998. 
7 Framework Convention on Civil Defence Assistance 2000.  
8 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes 1992. The 
Convention was concluded under the auspices of the UNECE and was originally limited to UNECE states. 
However, it was subsequently amended to allow non-UNECE states to accede. ECE, Meeting of the Parties to 
the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Amendment 
to Articles 25 and 26 of the Convention, Doc. ECE/MP.WAT/14, 12 January 2004. 
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procedures across states. The Convention contains two annexes relating to disaster relief, 
which are intended to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance following a disaster, 
through relief from import duties and taxes and modification of customs procedures.9  
B. Multilateral (Regional and Sub-Regional) Treaties 
More common than treaties adopted at the global level are regional and sub-regional 
treaties.10 In the Americas, a regional convention has been concluded on the provision of 
assistance in the event of a disaster.11 Several sub-regional instruments also exist, including 
in the Caribbean,12 and with respect to MERCOSUR states.13 In Asia, a regional convention 
does not exist, although several sub-regional conventions have been concluded, by ASEAN 
states and SAARC states.14 The Middle East also benefits from a regional agreement; indeed, 
it was one of the earlier conventions on the subject.15   
For its part, Europe has a developed legal framework relating to disaster response, primarily, 
although not exclusively, in EU law.16 Sub-regional agreements of importance include those 
                                                          
9 Specific Annexes B.3 and J.5. 
10 For further details, see IFRC Desk Study, supra note 2, at Chapter 4; de Guttry, supra note 2, at 17-33. 
11 Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance 1991. 
12 Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency 2008; Agreement between 
Member States and Associate Members of the Association of Caribbean States for Regional Cooperation on 
Natural Disasters 1999.  
13 Protocolo Adicional al Acuerdo Marco sobre Medio Ambiente del MERCOSUR en Materia de Cooperación y 
Asistencia Frente a Emergencias Ambientales 2004. 
14 ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response 2005; SAARC Agreement on Rapid 
Response to Natural Disasters 2011. 
15 Arab Cooperation Agreement on Regulating and Facilitating Relief Operations 1987. 
16 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 214 and Article 196 also Articles 6(f), 222(1), and 
196. See further Council Decision 2007/779/EC, Euratom Establishing a Community. See Civil Protection 
Mechanism (recast); Resolution of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Members 
States meeting within the Council, of 8 July 1991, on improving mutual aid between Member States in the 
Event of Natural or Technological Disaster, OJ C-198; Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives 
of the Governments of the Members States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the 
European Commission, The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, OJ C 25/01, 30 January 2008.  For an 
analysis of disaster relief law in the EU, see Gestri, ‘EU Disaster Response Law: Principles and Instruments’, in 
de Guttry, Gestry, and Venturini, supra note 2, at 105; Stefanelli and Williams, ‘Disaster Strikes: Regulatory 
Barriers to the Effective Delivery of International Disaster Assistance within the EU’ 2 Journal of International 
Humanitarian Legal Studies (JIHLS) (2011) 53. 
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concluded by Black Sea Economic Cooperation states,17 Nordic states,18 and the UN 
Economic Commission for Europe.19   
Fewer conventions in the area of disaster response have been concluded on the African 
continent.20 Indeed, that continent does not benefit from a regional agreement specifically on 
disaster response or, indeed, sub-regional agreements on the subject. That is not to suggest 
that there are no instruments of relevance. The Constitutive Act of the African Union 
provides that ‘[t]he Executive Council shall coordinate and take decisions on … 
environmental protection, humanitarian action and disaster response and relief.’21 At the sub-
regional level, the Agreement establishing the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
in Eastern Africa,22 and the Treaty of ECOWAS are also important.23  
Numerous regional and sub-regional conventions have thus been concluded on the issue of 
disaster relief. However, they do not cover the globe, with certain areas of the world not 
benefiting from any such conventions.  
C. Bilateral Treaties 
Compared to other areas of law, and to the global treaties on the subject of disaster relief, the 
number of bilateral treaties concluded in the area is significant.24 Indeed, bilateral treaties 
form the ‘bulk’ of the instruments in the area of disaster response.25 Bilateral agreements 
concluded on the subject are between states, often but not always between neighbouring 
states, and between a state and an international organization.  
                                                          
17 Agreement among the Governments of the Participating States of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
(BSEC) on Collaboration in Emergency Assistance and Emergency Response to Natural and Man-Made 
Disasters 1998. 
18 Mutual Emergency Assistance Agreement in Connection with Radiation 1963. 
19 Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents 1992. 
20 On which, see IFRC, Regional (Africa) Survey of Disaster Response Laws, Policies and Principles (April 
2007). 
21 Article 13(1)(e). 
22 See Article 13(q) and (r). 
23 The title of the Chapter in which the Article is located is ‘Co-operation in Environment and Natural 
Resources’. 
24 See the lists compiled by the ILC Secretariat, Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, Memorandum 
by the Secretariat, Addendum, A/CN.4/590/Add.2, 31 March 2008; and in de Guttry, supra note 2, at 715. The 
bilateral treaties cited in the pages that follow can be found in the IFRC database, available at 
https://ifrc.org/en/publications/disaster-law-database/.  
25 IFRC Desk Study, supra note 2, at 80. 
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The bilateral agreements are as varied in their subject matter as the multilateral conventions. 
Some relate to specific types of disasters, such as forest fires;26 whereas others relate to 
disasters generally.27 Some concern assistance in defined and very specific areas, such as 
search and rescue,28 or civil defence;29 whereas others regulate assistance generally.30  
D. Soft Law  
Leaving aside the work of the ILC and IFRC for the moment, which will be considered in 
detail in Part 3, soft law has been particularly important in the field of disaster relief.31 This 
was primarily due to the gaps in hard law that existed for many years and, to some extent, 
continue to exist today. The soft law has triggered the development of hard law and many 
legal developments, particularly at the domestic level, have been influenced by soft law. 
The soft law that exists in the area is numerous and varied. Some instruments have been 
concluded by states, but not in binding form, as is the case with the Guiding Principles on 
Humanitarian Assistance, annexed to General Assembly resolution 46/182 (1991). Although 
not binding as a matter of law, it is a critical instrument, indeed one of the foundational 
instruments of the UN’s work in the area. Indeed, in introducing the draft resolution before 
the General Assembly, the Guiding Principles were described as ‘landmark arrangements for 
putting in place a coordinated and effective system for humanitarian emergency assistance’.32 
The resolution was adopted by consensus and has since been recalled in numerous resolutions 
relating to humanitarian assistance.33 The Guiding Principles contain principles relating to 
                                                          
26 E.g. Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement between the United States of America and Canada on 
Mutual Assistance in Fighting Fires 1982. 
27 E.g. Convention between the Government of the French Republic and the Government of the Kingdom of  
Belgium on Mutual Assistance in the Event of Disasters or Serious Accidents 1981.  
28 E.g. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the 
Republic of Namibia regarding the Co-ordination of Search and Rescue Services 2000. 
29 E.g. Agreement between the Kingdom of Spain and the Kingdom of Morocco on Technical Cooperation and 
Mutual Assistance in the Field of Civil Defence 1987.  
30 E.g. Agreement between the Swiss Federal Council and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines on 
Cooperation in the Event of Natural Disaster or Major Emergencies (2001); Agreement between Austria and 
Federal Republic of Germany concerning Mutual Assistance in the Event of Disasters or Serious Accidents 
1988.  
31 de Guttry, supra note 2, at 10.  
32 General Assembly, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 78th Meeting, A/46/PV.78, 8 January 1992, 37 
(Sweden). 
33 See e.g. GA Res 67/231, 9 April 2013. 
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humanitarian assistance and the role and responsibilities of various actors. They also contain 
principles on prevention, preparedness, and stand-by capacity. Importantly for UN purposes, 
the Guiding Principles also envisaged the creation of the position of Emergency Relief 
Coordinator and an Inter-Agency Standing Committee, both of which have been established.  
Other instruments have been drafted by UN entities. Of particular note in the present context 
are the 1977 Recommendations concerning measures to expedite relief and the 1984 draft 
convention on Expediting the Delivery of Emergency Relief, both concluded under the 
auspices of the Office of the UN Disaster Relief Co-ordinator.34 Also of importance are the 
1982 UNITAR Model Rules for Disaster Relief Operations.35  
Still other soft law instruments have been drawn up by influential non-state actors.36 
Although soft law emanating from non-state actors has been described as ‘[p]erhaps the most 
controversial claimants to international soft law status’,37 in the field of disaster relief law, 
this type of soft law has proven significant. Of particular note is the 1994 Red Cross Code of 
Conduct. That Code of Conduct is a voluntary code, containing 10 principles together with 
recommendations to governments of affected states, donor governments, and international 
organizations. As at January 2017, it had been signed by 621 humanitarian organizations,38 
and many humanitarian organizations consider the Code to contain ‘binding principles’.39 
However, the organizations in question are predominantly European organizations with few 
                                                          
34 Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/32/64, 
12 May 1977, Annex II; Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator, Report of the Secretary-
General, Addendum, Proposed draft convention on expediting the delivery of emergency relief, UN Doc. 
A/39/267/Add.2-E/1984/96/Add.2, 18 June 1984. 
35 See M. el Baradei, Model Rules for Disaster Relief Operations (1982).  
36 See e.g. Institut de Droit International, Bruges Resolution on Humanitarian Assistance (2003); International 
Institute of Humanitarian Law, Guiding Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance (1993), reprinted at 
33 International Review of the Red Cross (IRRC) (1993) 519; Max Planck Institute, International Guidelines for 
Humanitarian Assistance Operations (1991); International Law Association, Draft Model Agreement relating to 
Humanitarian Relief Operations (1982), reprinted at International Law Association, Report of the Fifty-Ninth 
Conference Held at Belgrade, August 17th, 1980 to August 23rd, 1980 (1981), at 520-530. 
37 Chinkin, ‘Normative Development in the International Legal System’, in D. Shelton (ed), Commitment and 
Compliance: the Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System (2000), at 29. See also Pronto, 
‘Understanding the Hard/Soft Distinction in International Law’, 48 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 
(2015) 941, at 946. 
38 
http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Documents/Secretariat/Copy%20of%20Code%20of%20Conduct%20UPDATED_Ja
nuary%202017.pdf  
39 Cubie, ‘An Analysis of Soft Law Applicable to Humanitarian Assistance: Relative Normativity in Action?’, 2 
JIHLS (2011) 177, at 195. 
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located in Africa.40 Although the Code of Conduct is open for signature only to the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent movement and to NGOs, it is also used by states and international 
organizations. Some entities, such as the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid 
Department, ‘require[] endorsement of the Code of Conduct as a condition of funding’, while 
others, such as the UK’s Disasters Evaluation Committee use the Code of Conduct ‘as the 
basis for evaluation of humanitarian responses by its constituent members.’41 In 2006-7, the 
IFRC undertook a survey of governments, international humanitarian organizations and 
national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies on a range of issues relating to disaster law. 
One such issue concerned their use of various instruments. 76% of respondents reported that 
they used the 2004 Red Cross Code of Conduct, with 61% of national societies, 53% of 
governments and 82% of international humanitarian organization headquarters reporting that 
they did so ‘frequently or always’.42  
Also influential in this regard are the Sphere standards, which are ‘universal minimum 
standards’ in the area of humanitarian response.43 They were designed to be a set of voluntary 
standards and to complement other relevant standards.44 They apply generally to 
humanitarian response and specifically in areas such as: water supply, sanitation, and hygiene 
promotion; and shelter, settlement, and non-food items. In the same survey, 72% of 
respondents reported that they used the 2011 Sphere Handbook, with 50% of national 
societies, 35% of governments and 82% of international humanitarian organization 
headquarters reporting that they did so ‘frequently or always’.45 Of particular note, the 
Kampala Convention provides that states parties shall ‘[p]ut in place measures for monitoring 
and evaluating the effectiveness and impact of the humanitarian assistance delivered to 
internally displaced persons in accordance with relevant practice, including the Sphere 
Standards.’46 The Sphere standards have thus been singled out in a binding instrument as 
standards to be utilized by states parties to the Convention. 
                                                          
40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid. 
42 IFRC Desk Study, supra note 2, at Appendix 3, 206. 
43 The Sphere Project, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response (2011), at ii 
(hereinafter: Sphere Handbook). 
44 Ibid, at 8 and 31. 
45 IFRC Desk Study, supra note 2, at Appendix 3, 207. 
46 Article 9(2)(m), African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons 
in Africa. 
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E. Summary 
A whole host of instruments thus exist on the issue of disaster relief. These instruments are 
hard law and soft law; multilateral and bilateral; international, regional, and sub-regional; 
subject-specific and general. National legislation is also in place in some states, which 
addresses some of the topics that are addressed in international instruments.  
Importantly, the instruments regulate the same sorts of issues, namely offers of humanitarian 
assistance, requests for assistance, and the acceptance of assistance; the direction and control 
of assistance; and modalities relating to the provision of assistance, such as the issuance of 
visas for relief personnel, the waiver of customs duties and taxes, and freedom of movement. 
They also tend to approach the issues in largely the same way, though there are also areas of 
real difference.47 Nonetheless, it remains the case that an overarching treaty on the subject is 
lacking. The international law of disaster relief remains piecemeal.   
 
3. The Emergence of a Holistic Body of International Law relating to Disaster 
Relief 
As is evident from Part 2, a significant number of treaties and other instruments regulate the 
provision of disaster relief. As is also evident, these instruments are piecemeal in nature.  
Since the 2000s, concrete attempts have been made to identify and create a holistic body of 
international law relating to the provision of disaster relief. This was because, despite the 
existence of the piecemeal instruments, there was a ‘yawning gap’ at the core of disaster 
relief law.48 Writing in 2000, the IFRC observed:  
‘There is no definitive, broadly accepted source of international law which spells out 
legal standards, procedures, rights and duties pertaining to disaster response and 
assistance. No systematic attempt has been made to pull together the disparate threads 
of existing law, to formalize customary law or to expand and develop the law in new 
ways.’49  
                                                          
47 Areas of real difference exist, in particular, in relation to which party bears the costs of providing assistance 
and issues of liability. On the former, see de Guttry, supra note 2, at 13; on the latter, see Bartolini, ‘Attribution 
of Conduct and Liability Issues Arising from International Disaster Relief Missions: Theoretical and Pragmatic 
Approaches to Guaranteeing Accountability’, 48 Vanderbilt JTL (2015) 1029. 
48 IFRC, World Disasters Report (2000), at 145. 
49 Ibid. 
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Gaps also exist, with certain states not being party to any instrument; and there being 
relatively little by way of customary international law in the area.50  
The piecemeal nature of the law meant that there was little clarity on the rights and 
obligations of the state affected by the disaster, individuals affected by the disaster, or those 
seeking to provide assistance. As a consequence, the response to disasters varied 
considerably. In some instances, assistance was provided to persons affected by the disaster 
in a timely manner. In other instances, however, assistance from outside the state was 
delayed, due to visa restrictions, backlogs at customs, or problems of coordination.51 In still 
other instances, outside assistance was refused.52 There have also been cases of mismatch 
between the assistance required and the assistance provided.53 Some of the responses were 
due to the lack of law, with the affected state not being party to the relevant treaty, or the 
relevant treaty not covering the particular disaster or intended assistance. Other responses 
emerged as a result of a lack of clarity in the law or a lack of knowledge of the law. To quote 
the IFRC again: ‘[i]n the absence of commonly agreed standards, the disaster victim is at the 
mercy of the vagaries of humanitarian response, political calculation, indifference or 
ignorance.’54 At times, there was sense of having to re-invent the wheel each time a disaster 
occurred. 
Accordingly, there was a considered attempt to create a holistic body of law. The work of the 
IFRC and ILC has been crucial in this regard. Draft Articles of the ILC identify and 
progressively develop the law relating to the protection of persons in the event of disasters. 
Likewise, the IFRC, the leading actor in the area of disaster response law in general and the 
law relating to disaster relief in particular, has identified and developed disaster relief law 
                                                          
50 The ILC, in its work on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, has identified some customary 
rules. See Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, supra note 1, Commentary to 
Draft Article 11, at para 3. However, as is common to the ILC’s work, it tends not to distinguish between 
aspects of codification and progressive development. See further, below, Part 3.c.2. For its part, the IFRC 
indicated early on its work that ‘[r]esearch completed to date does not suggest the existence of a system of 
customary IDRL’ but noted that further reserach might prove otherwise. Hoffman, ‘What is the scope of 
international disaster response law ?’, in IFRC, International Disaster Response Laws, Principles and Practice: 
Reflections, Prospects and Challenges (2003), at 16. See also ILC Secretariat Memo, supra note 24, at para. 42. 
In its Annotations to the Draft Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster 
Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance, 26 October 2007, at 6, the IFRC did identify some customary rules, 
however, these were few in number.   
51 IFRC Desk Study, supra note 2, at 98-9 and 116-7. 
52 Ibid, 89.  
53 Ibid, 99-100. 
54 World Disasters Report, supra note 48, at 145-6. 
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through the adoption of Guidelines and the drafting of a Model Act. Both bodies have done 
so in a holistic manner, addressing disaster relief generally. Their work is not limited to 
specific types of disaster, specific forms of disaster relief, or specific regions of the world. 
These bodies are thus identifying and developing the international law of disaster relief as a 
body of law rather than as a patchwork of norms. In so doing, the initiatives follow the 
approach of other soft law instruments, which were also in this direction.55 
In 2001, the Council of Delegates of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement adopted a resolution encouraging the IFRC to continue its work on the subject.56 
This was followed by a request to the IFRC by the International Conference of the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent (International Conference) in 2003 to continue its ‘compilation of the laws, 
rules and principles applicable to international disaster response’, including ‘identifying any 
outstanding needs in terms of the legal and regulatory framework’ and ‘developing … 
models, tools and guidelines for practical use in international disaster response activities.’57 
This led to the IFRC producing Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of 
International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance. Seeking to fill the gap that it 
had previously identified, the Guidelines cover all aspects of disaster relief, including the 
responsibilities of affected states and assisting actors; the initiation and termination of 
disaster relief; and modalities for delivering assistance. In so doing, the IFRC intended to 
develop a holistic body of law, developing the piecemeal one, which it had previously 
criticised.  
The Guidelines were adopted by the International Conference in 2007.58 As the International 
Conference comprises states parties to the Geneva Conventions, the ICRC, IFRC, and 
national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the Guidelines were adopted also by states. 
Although the Guidelines are explicitly described as ‘non-binding’, the IFRC expressed the 
hope ‘that States will make use of them to strengthen their laws, policies and/or 
procedures’.59  
                                                          
55 See supra, fn 36. 
56 Council of Delegates (2001), Resolution 5. The Council of Delegates comprises the ICRC, IFRC and national 
Red Cross and Red Crescent societies. 
57 28th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (2003), Resolution 1, Agenda for 
Humanitarian Action, at 3.2.6. 
58 Resolution 4. 
59 IFRC Guidelines, Article 1(1). 
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Following the adoption of the Guidelines, the IFRC received requests from, and provided 
assistance to, states in the drafting of legislation and was frequently requested to provide 
‘model legislative language’.60 The IFRC had also been requested by the International 
Conference to ‘promote the mainstreaming of the Guidelines in all relevant existing legal-
development, disaster management and risk reduction initiatives’ and to continue its ‘research 
and advocacy efforts, and the development of tools and models for the improvement of legal 
preparedness for disasters’.61 As such, in 2013, the IFRC prepared a Model Act for the 
Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance, 
which was specifically ‘intended to help states to be prepared for the most common legal and 
regulatory issues that arise in major international disaster operations’.62 The Model Act 
contains a series of detailed provisions on the initiation and termination of international 
disaster assistance, the coordination and preparedness of such assistance, responsibilities of 
assisting actors, and modalities for the provision of such assistance. It, too, approaches the 
issues in a holistic manner.  
In 2011, the IFRC reported that nine states had adopted domestic legislation which was either 
‘inspired by or consistent with aspects of the IDRL [International Disaster Response Law] 
Guidelines.’63 By 2015, the number of states that had amended their laws and policies, 
drawing on the Guidelines, had risen to 21.64 In this way, a consistent body of disaster relief 
law is emerging at the national level.  
For its part, the ILC commenced its work on the international law regulating the provision of 
disaster relief in 2008, under the rubric of the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters. 
Its initial reports noted the absence of a ‘universal convention comprehensively governing all 
                                                          
60 IFRC Model Act, page 7. 
61 30th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (2007), Resolution 4, at para. 5. 
62 IFRC Model Act, supra note 60, page 8. 
63 Finland, Indonesia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, United States of 
America. See Document prepared by the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
in Consultation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, Progress in the Implementation of the 
Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery 
Assistance: Background Report (October 2011), at 4-5.  
64 ‘Strengthening legal frameworks for disaster response, risk reduction and first aid: Background Report’, 23nd 
International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, 8-10 December 2015, 4. Further details are 
available at https://www.ifrc.org/what-we-do/disaster-law/about-disaster-law/international-disaster-response-
laws-rules-and-principles/idrl-guidelines/new-legislation-adopted-on-idrl/.  
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the main aspects of disaster relief.’65 The draft Articles, which were adopted by the ILC in 
August 2016, include provisions on inter alia offers and the seeking of assistance, consent to 
the provision of assistance, modalities for the provision of assistance, and the termination of 
assistance.66 The ILC recommended to the General Assembly the elaboration of a convention 
on the basis of the Draft Articles.67 Were such a convention to be concluded, a treaty of 
global application would come into being. Even if the General Assembly decides otherwise, 
with the conclusion of draft Articles, a holistic body of international law relating to disaster 
relief is emerging at the international level. 
The emergence of a holistic body of international law relating to disaster relief has taken 
place, consciously or subconsciously, through the utilization of three techniques: (1) the 
creation of a generalized multilateral standard through extrapolation from more specific 
instruments, be it from the subject-specific to the general, the regional to the global, or the 
bilateral to the multilateral; and preparing a Model Act for incorporation into domestic law, 
thus creating consistent domestic legislation; (2) analogy to related bodies of law, in 
particular international humanitarian law; and (3) through the development of instruments 
which are soft in form but which contain a mix of lex lata and lex ferenda.  
These three techniques are often utilized in the making and shaping of international law. 
They are used frequently in developing general international law, such as the rules of state 
responsibility, as well as in particular fields of international law, such as international 
investment law and the law relating to internally displaced persons. Accordingly, their use in 
the making of the international law of disaster relief is simply a further example of their use 
in the development of international law. At the same time, a certain care must be taken when 
using the techniques to develop a holistic set of rules.  
A. Generalized Multilateral Standards and Model Laws 
1. International Law of Disaster Relief  
Various attempts have been made over the years to conclude an overarching treaty on the 
subject of disaster relief. Such a treaty was, in fact, concluded in 1927, namely the 
                                                          
65 ILC Secretariat Memo, supra note 24, at para. 3; Preliminary Report on the Protection of Persons in the Event 
of Disasters, A/CN.4/598, 5 May 2008, para. 31. 
66 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 1. See also the reports of the Special Rapporteur, available at 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/6_3.htm.  
67 Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 1, at para. 46.  
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Convention Establishing an International Relief Union (IRU).68 However, the operation of 
the IRU was unsuccessful due to lack of funding, ambivalence on the part of many states, and 
institutional tensions.69 Accordingly, and with the demise of the League of Nations, it largely 
fell by the wayside. Attempts were made to conclude a treaty on disaster relief again in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s under the auspices of the Office of the UN Disaster Relief 
Coordinator and a draft Convention on Expediting the Delivery of Emergency Relief was 
prepared.70  However, a treaty on the subject failed to be concluded.  
Instead of an overarching multilateral agreement on international disaster relief at the global 
level, as discussed above, a series of piecemeal treaties have been concluded, as have 
bilateral agreements and soft law instruments. As also noted above, these agreements are 
largely similar in their approach and regulate the same sorts of issues.  
The ILC and the IFRC have used the general consistency of these instruments to establish 
generalized multilateral standards on disaster relief. They have extrapolated from the 
narrower instruments to form a broader standard. This is particularly evident in the reports of 
the ILC Special Rapporteur, which set out, sometimes in great detail, the reasons for the 
conclusion of a particular draft article. For example, the draft Article on the right to offer 
assistance is preceded by relevant provisions of the Convention on Assistance in the Case of 
a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Inter-American Convention, the Tampere 
Convention, the Framework Convention on Civil Defence Assistance, the ASEAN 
Agreement, and resolutions of the Institut de Droit International, all of which take a largely 
similar approach to the issue.71 On the basis of the consistency of these very particular 
instruments, the Special Rapporteur is able to propose a provision that is much the same in 
subject matter but of broader, global, scope.  
This is largely true also of the IFRC Guidelines, the Annotations to which note that certain 
provisions are ‘similar’ in their language to particular instruments, or that the language of a 
                                                          
68 On which, see M.-A. Borgeaud, L’Union Internationale de Secours (1932); C. Gorgé, The International Relief 
Union (1938); Macalister-Smith, ‘The International Relief Union: Reflections on Establishing an International 
Relief Union of July 12, 1927’, 54 Legal History Review (1986) 363. 
69 See Hutchinson, ‘Disasters and the International Order – II: The International Relief Union’, 23 International 
History Review (2001) 253. 
70 On which, see P. Macalister-Smith, International Humanitarian Assistance: Disaster Relief Actions in 
International Law and Organization (1985), at Chapter 9. 
71 Fourth report on the protection of persons in the event of disasters, by Mr Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, Special 
Rapporteur, A/CN.4/643, 11 May 2011, paras 88-95. 
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provision is ‘drawn from’ particular instruments.72 Indeed, the introduction to the 
Annotations notes that they ‘summarize the legal precedents upon which [the Guidelines] are 
based.’73  
The ILC and the IFRC have thus extrapolated from subject-specific and region-specific 
treaties, bilateral agreements, and soft law instruments to form a generalized multilateral 
standard.  
As discussed above, the IFRC has also prepared a Model Act, which is designed to assist 
states in the incorporation of the IFRC Guidelines into their domestic law. States have started 
to incorporate parts of the Act into their domestic legal systems. Should this continue, a 
generalized standard would be achieved, but at the level of domestic law. 
2. Use of the Technique in International Law 
Treaties are generally considered to be the most important source of international law.74 The 
advantages of treaties over customary international law and general principles of law are 
readily apparent. Treaties are easily identified. They can be located and read to discern their 
content. This is unlike custom and general principles, both of which have to be constructed. 
The existence of a customary rule is too often asserted without any proof. At the same time, 
when proof is provided and the methodology behind the determination set out explicitly, it is 
open to challenge. The existence of customary international law is thus both easy to assert 
and easy to deny. With relatively few exceptions, the practice and opinio juris of particular 
states tends to be privileged, not necessarily for ideological reasons, but due to the 
availability of materials, familiarity with practice, and linguistic capability on the part of the 
identifier. Likewise, the category of general principles is uncertain, including on fundamental 
matters such as precisely how a general principle is identified.  
Despite – or perhaps because of – their importance, grand multilateral treaties have proven 
difficult to conclude in recent years.75 Accordingly, a number of techniques have been 
developed to circumvent this difficulty while staying as close as possible to the form and 
language of a treaty. One such technique is the development of a generalized multilateral 
standard; another is the conclusion of a model act.  
                                                          
72 See e.g. Annotations to the Draft Guidelines, supra note 50, at 30 and 31. 
73 Ibid, 3. 
74 See e.g. J. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (2012), at 30.  
75 This is true particularly of codification conventions. 
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An example of the development of generalized multilateral standards from a series of 
consistent piecemeal standards is the field of international investment law. In that field, 
various attempts have been made to conclude a multilateral investment treaty. For example, 
following the Second World War, attempts were made to conclude the Havana Charter for an 
International Trade Organization; and OECD states also sought to conclude a multilateral 
agreement on investment.76 However, both attempts were unsuccessful. Instead, numerous 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have been concluded. Indeed, some 2,500 BITs have been 
concluded in the last few decades,77 together with a number of regional treaties such as the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and subject specific treaties such as the 
Energy Charter Treaty.  
Although this network of bilateral agreements might suggest that international investment 
law is fragmented and piecemeal, this is not the case. On the contrary, a generalized 
framework is in place despite the absence of an overarching multilateral treaty. BITs tend to 
take the same form, composed as they are of three key parts – the first part containing 
definitions of key terms; the second covering substantive standards of protection, for example 
a guarantee of fair and equitable treatment, a guarantee of most-favoured-nation treatment, 
and a guarantee in case of expropriation; and the third on dispute settlement.78 Indeed, on the 
basis of similarities in the structure and content of the BITs, given that many BITs are based 
on model BITs thus ensuring consistency between them, due to most-favoured nation clauses, 
and in light of relatively consistent interpretation on the part of arbitral tribunals, at least in 
certain respects, it has been suggested that the numerous bilateral treaties operate akin to a 
multilateral system.79  
The generalized framework is particularly evident insofar as the substantive standards of 
protection are concerned. For example, one of the substantive standards of protection that are 
contained in BITs is the fair and equitable treatment standard. Some take the view that this 
simply refers to the historical international minimum standard of treatment in customary 
                                                          
76 See Vandevelde, ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’, 12 University College Davis 
Journal of International Law and Politics (2005-2006) 157; Dattu, ‘A Journey from Havana to Paris: The Fifty-
Year Quest for the Elusive Multilateral Agreement on Investment’, 24 Fordham International Law Journal 
(2000) 275. 
77 R. Dolzer and C. Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (2012), at 13.   
78 Ibid, at 13-14; S.W. Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law (2009), at Chapter III. 
79 See generally ibid. 
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international law as reflected in cases such as Neer.80 Others argue that the BIT standard of 
fair and equitable treatment contributes to the modification of the customary international law 
standard.81 Still others argue that the BIT standard reflects a customary international law 
standard on fair and equitable treatment.82 Others yet hold that the fair and equitable 
treatment standard is an independent and autonomous treaty standard and includes notions 
such as transparency.83 The ‘correct’ answer to the debate is of less interest for present 
purposes. Of rather more interest is the idea that that a series of consistent bilateral treaties 
can form a multilateral standard, whether at the level of customary international law or in 
terms of a generalized multilateral standard. Indeed, one of the reasons why states concluded 
BITs was precisely in order to develop a multilateral standard. Thus, one individual who was 
involved in the negotiation of BITs has observed that ‘the United States hoped that the 
conclusion of a sufficiently large network of treaties embracing that standard [prompt, 
adequate, and effective compensation for expropriation] would provide evidence that the 
standard was a norm of customary international law and thus applied to expropriations even 
in the absence of a treaty.’84 
Thus, in the area of international investment law, it is largely a series of bilateral agreements 
that map the field, rather than an overarching multilateral agreement. Over time, with an 
increasing number of agreements and an increasing number of states that are parties to 
agreements, and by virtue of their relative consistency, these agreements have arguably given 
rise to generalized multilateral standards. Furthermore, these generalized standards stemmed 
from the inability of states to conclude a global treaty on the subject.  
The creation of a generalized standard through extrapolation from more specialized areas is 
by no means particular to international investment law. The International Law Commission, 
in its Articles on State Responsibility, used a similar technique in formulating Article 16 on 
                                                          
80 LFH Neer and Pauline Neer v United Mexican States (1926) 4 RIAA 60, 61-2. See eg NAFTA 
(UNCITRAL), Glamis Gold Ltd v United States of America, Award, 8 June 2009, at para. 616. 
81 E.g. ICSID, Mondev International Ltd v United States of America - Award, 11 October 2002, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/99/2, at paras 117 and 125. 
82 ICSID, Merrill and Ring Forestry LP v Canada - Award, 31 March 2010, ICSID Case No. UNCT/07/1, at 
para 213. See also I. Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Law of Foreign 
Investment (2008), at Chapter 2. 
83 E.g. ICSID, Metalclad Corporation v United States of America - Award, 30 August 2000, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/97/1. at para. 76. This position was not upheld in the review of the Award: The United Mexican 
States v Metalclad Corporation [2001] BCSC 664, at para. 72.  
84 Vandevelde, supra note 76, at 171. 
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complicity. The ILC provides for a general rule on complicity – a state aiding or assisting 
another state in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter – on the basis 
of international law rules on complicity in the specific areas of aggression, circumvention of 
sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council, and human rights violations.85 From these 
three very particular subject areas, a generalized rule on complicity was formulated.86   
For their part, model laws have a variety of functions. At one level, they can be useful in 
translating a treaty commitment, for example to assist with incorporation of a treaty into 
domestic law. They also serve to ensure consistency in statutory language of states that use 
them. At another level, model laws can serve to bypass the difficulties associated with the 
conclusion of multilateral treaties. As discussed above, in international investment law, 
OECD states attempted to conclude a multilateral treaty on investment but the attempts 
failed. Despite that failure, the draft Convention ‘was recommended to OECD Members as a 
model for the conclusion of bilateral treaties with developing countries.’87 And the draft did 
indeed influence the BITs of a number of OECD states.88  
Nowhere can the use of model laws be seen more clearly than in the UN Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). UNCITRAL is mandated by the UN General 
Assembly to promote ‘the progressive harmonization and unification of the law of 
international trade’.89 It does so, in part, by adopting model laws, which are designed to assist 
states in the development of their own domestic legislation. One such model law, the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, has been used by some 67 
states as a basis for their domestic legislation.90 The use of a model law in this area is 
considered to have been ‘at least as effective, if not more so, than traditional public 
international law techniques’ such as the conclusion of a treaty.91 As a model law, states are 
                                                          
85 See Commentary to Article 16, paras 7-9. 
86 See further Nolte and Aust, ‘Equivocal Helpers – Complicit States, Mixed Messages and International Law’, 
58 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (ICLQ) (2009) 1, at 7-8; M. Jackson, Complicity in 
International Law (2015), at Chapter 7. 
87 Schill, supra note 78, at 39. 
88 Ibid, at 39. 
89 GA Res 2205 (XXI), 17 December 1966. 
90 Status of legislation based on Model Act, available at :  
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html.  
91 E. Gaillard and J. Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration 
(1999), at 108, para. 205. 
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provided with a greater degree of discretion in departing from the law than a treaty would 
allow.92  
Accordingly, although model laws are not binding, in many cases, they have had a significant 
influence on the development of laws that are binding. Although operating at the vertical 
level rather than the horizontal one, in a number of instances, they have been used to bypass 
difficulties associated with the conclusion of treaties. They also contribute to the creation of a 
generalized multilateral standard, but at the level of domestic law.  
Both approaches depart from the classic model of the multilateral treaty. However, in doing 
so, they serve to confirm its importance by sticking closely to the ideas behind it.  
3. Limits of the Technique 
As is evident from the preceding section, the development of generalized standards and the 
adoption of model acts are not particular to the international law of disaster relief. Rather, 
they can be seen as techniques that are used in international law as a result of the difficulty, 
sometimes inability, in concluding an overarching multilateral treaty on a particular subject, 
coupled with the importance of multilateral treaties in international law.  
The generalized multilateral standard approach – whether at the international level or, 
through model laws, at the domestic level – has the advantage of filling in gaps in the law. It 
moves away from piecemeal standards towards holistic ones that are based on those 
piecemeal standards. Insofar as model laws are concerned, there is also discretion on the part 
of the implementing state to tailor the law to meet the specificities of the relevant legal 
system.  
The model act approach also has certain disadvantages. Model acts tend to be more useful for 
common law states, where stand-alone acts are adopted. For other states, which do not take 
the common law approach, they are far less useful, as different parts of the act might have to 
be incorporated into different parts of the relevant code. Furthermore, there is no obligation to 
follow the language or approach of a model act. The advantage of flexibility that model acts 
afford can also prove disadvantageous when seeking consistency as states can depart from 
them sometimes radically.  
                                                          
92 Kerr, ‘Arbitration and the Courts: The UNCITRAL Model Law’, 34 ICLQ (1985) 1, at 7-8. On the different 
approaches taken by states, see Sanders, ‘Unity and Diversity in the Adoption of the Model Law’, 11 
Arbitration International (1995) 1. 
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Developing a multilateral standard from piecemeal standards in the area of disaster relief law 
also has the potential to mislead. It presents the situation as a holistic one when there are very 
real, and possibly very deliberate, gaps. For example, some disaster relief conventions, such 
as, at the time of writing, the Agreement between Member States and Associate Members of 
the Association of Caribbean States for Regional Cooperation on Natural Disasters, are not in 
force. Others, such as the Tampere Convention,93 and the Inter-American Convention to 
Facilitate Disaster Assistance,94 have few states parties. Thus, to generalize from them can be 
somewhat artificial, at least if generalization is intended to suggest that states have accepted 
the relevant approach, albeit at the level of the particular instrument.  
Variations also exist between different regions of the world. As discussed above, in some 
areas of the world, such as Africa, there are few treaties on the issue of disaster relief.95 
Accordingly, to generalize from treaties concluded in particular parts of the world to create a 
global standard overlooks gaps in, and specificities of, particular regions.  
A similar issue arises with respect to bilateral agreements. To generalize from bilateral 
agreements might be to overlook the reasons behind the conclusion of the particular 
agreement. A state might be willing to conclude a bilateral agreement with a state with which 
it shares a territorial border for reasons of self-interest, such as to prevent persons fleeing on 
to its territory, or in order to be a good neighbour. It does not follow that a state would be 
willing to apply the standard set out in the agreement generally to all states.  
Furthermore, the treaties do not take a common approach to certain issues. On the matter of 
which state bears the costs of disaster relief, different treaties take different approaches. Some 
treaties indicate that the sending state bears the costs; others that it is the receiving state; still 
others that the costs are to be shared; others yet take a different approach altogether.96 On the 
matter of liability, some instruments request the state affected by the disaster to waive claims 
against the assisting state, with exceptions being made for willful misconduct and gross 
negligence. Others provide that the assisting state is liable; still others that the affected state 
                                                          
93 At the time of writing, the Tampere Convention had 48 states parties. 
94 At the time of writing, the Inter-American Convention had 6 states parties. 
95 See supra, Part 2.b. 
96 For illustrations of the different approaches, see eg SAARC Agreement, supra note 14, at Article XV; 
Tampere Convention, supra note 6, at Article 7; [France/Switzerland] Agreement on Mutual Assistance in the 
Event of Disasters or Serious Accidents 1987, at Article 10. See further de Guttry, supra note 2, at 13-14. 
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and the assisting state are to consult and coordinate with one another on any claims.97 
Accordingly, on certain issues, there is a lack of consistency of instruments such as to allow 
for generalization.  
Ultimately, the ‘generalized standard’ approach packages things neatly and presents a 
coherent picture, when, in reality, the international law in the area is rather messy. Indeed, the 
field of disaster relief law is very different to international investment law. There are nowhere 
near the number of treaties in the area of disaster relief; it is by no means the case that nearly 
all states have concluded at least one such treaty; and courts and tribunals are involved 
infrequently and do not operate so as to homogenize standards. Accordingly, although the 
generalization approach might work in the area of international investment law, the suitability 
of the approach for disaster relief law is more open to question.  
Furthermore, to generalize tends to be to apply the same standard, perhaps even the very 
same language, without analysis of whether the particular standard set out is the most 
appropriate one. The reports of the ILC Special Rapporteur do not explain in what way the 
standards of particular instruments that are set out in the reports are being used, for example 
as relevant practice, sources of inspiration, or something different. Instead, following 
recitation of the standards, the reports often state, without more, that ‘in the light of the 
foregoing, the Special Rapporteur proposes’ the draft article that is then set out.98 In this way, 
without a proper explanation, the standard adopted seems to be used out of habit or 
convenience rather than following search for the best possible solution. In many respects, this 
is a normal part of law-making. It might be seen as more legitimate to refer to a standard that 
already exists than to ‘invent’ one. However, it also means that the standard is used 
uncritically; it is used simply because it has already been used elsewhere.  
A useful illustration of the various limits of the technique of generalization relates to the ILC 
draft Article on the termination of assistance which was adopted on first reading. Disaster 
relief instruments take a variety of approaches to the subject, including providing that the 
assisting state can terminate the assistance, the receiving state can terminate the assistance, 
                                                          
97 For illustrations of the different approaches, see eg Inter-American Convention, supra note 11, at Article XII; 
ASEAN Agreement, supra note 14, at Article 12(3); France/Switzerland Agreement, supra note 90, at Article 
11. See further Bartolini, supra note 47, at 1049-50. 
98 See eg Sixth Report on the protection of persons in the event of disasters by Eduardo Valencia-Ospina Special 
Rapporteur, A/CN.4/662, 3 May 2013, para. 162. 
22 
 
and requiring consultation before the assistance is terminated.99 In his discussion on the 
termination of assistance, the Special Rapporteur observes that ‘[i]nternational instruments 
bearing on this topic have addressed termination of assistance in a number of ways’, and 
recalls the report of the Secretariat, which provided that ‘termination provisions contain 
subtle differences in formulation which could have a significant impact in practice’.100 Yet, 
after setting out the standards of different instruments, which reveal some of the different 
approaches on the subject, the report simply states, without more, that ‘[b]earing the 
foregoing in mind, the Special Rapporteur proposes the following draft article … The 
affected State and assisting actors shall consult with each other to determine the duration of 
the external assistance’.101 No explanation is given as to why the approach contained in the 
draft article was selected instead of the approaches of other instruments. This is particularly 
problematic because it suggests that the termination of assistance is conditioned on 
consultation and that a state is not entitled to terminate assistance at any time.102 The draft 
Article was subsequently amended on second reading, following criticism by states.103 
The critique is not to suggest that the technique of generalization can never be used or is 
inherently unsuitable for development of the law relating to disaster relief. Rather, care needs 
to be taken in respect of the instruments from which extrapolation takes place. It would be 
easier to extrapolate from a series of consistent piecemeal standards, for example, where 
there are large numbers of states parties from different geographic regions to numerous 
agreements containing the same provision. It might also be proper to generalize from a series 
of consistent domestic laws on disaster relief, where they are sufficiently numerous and 
similar in content. Likewise, on occasion, language used in one treaty can be found, 
sometimes verbatim, in other treaties. This is true, for example, of provisions requiring 
                                                          
99 For illustrations of the different approaches, see eg BSEC Agreement, supra note 17, at Article 13(1); 
Tampere Convention, supra note 6, at Article 6; Agreement between the Republic of Austria and the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan on Mutual Assistance in the case of Disasters or Serious Accidents 2004, at Article 12. 
100 Fifth Report on the protection of persons in the event of disasters by Eduardo Valencia-Ospina Special 
Rapporteur, A/CN.4/652, 9 April 2012, at para. 183. 
101 Ibid, para. 187. 
102 This is without prejudice to limits on the termination, such as in the case of an arbitrary revocation of 
consent.  
103 See Article 17, in ‘Titles and texts of the preamble and draft articles 1 to 18 of the draft articles on the 
Protection of persons in the event of disasters adopted, on second reading, by the Drafting Committee’, 
A/CN.4/L.871, 27 May 2016. 
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compliance with domestic laws and regulations.104 Where a template can be identified, 
extrapolation from the template is more understandable. In essence, there needs to be an 
assessment as to whether generalization and extrapolation is appropriate in a particular 
circumstance, for example, with respect to a particular norm.  
B. Analogy  
1. International Law of Disaster Relief 
A second technique that has been used by the ILC and the IFRC is that of analogy. Many of 
the issues arising during a disaster are similar to those that arise during an armed conflict. 
Disasters and armed conflicts force large numbers of persons to flee their homes, causing 
them to be displaced. Large numbers of people are killed during a disaster or armed conflict, 
raising issues relating to their identification and burial. Many others go missing, requiring 
efforts to trace them and reunite them with their families. Certain groups of persons tend to 
be particularly vulnerable in time of armed conflict and disaster, such as children, the elderly, 
and the disabled.  
The commonalities in the issues arising during an armed conflict and following a disaster 
exist even at the level of detail. For example, in the area of humanitarian assistance, the 
issues raised are remarkably similar, including what constitutes humanitarian assistance, 
whether humanitarian assistance may be offered and by whom, the requirement of consent to 
assistance, as well as the modalities concerning delivery of humanitarian assistance, such as 
facilitating entry and delivery.105 Accordingly, the question arises as to whether, and, if so, to 
what extent, international humanitarian law (IHL) can be drawn upon to develop the law 
relating to disaster relief. 
Unlike international disaster relief law, which is in its infancy, the body of law that regulates 
armed conflicts – IHL – is well-developed. The multilateral legal framework can be dated 
                                                          
104 See eg the similarity between the Tampere Convention, supra note 6, at Article 5(7) (‘duty to respect the 
laws and regulations of that State Party’); the Nuclear Accident Convention, supra note 4, at Article 8(7) (‘duty 
to respect the laws and regulations of the requesting State’); the Agreement establishing the Caribbean Disaster 
Emergency Response Agency, supra note 12, at Article 21(5) (‘a duty to respect the law and regulations of the 
requesting State’); and the Inter-American Convention, supra note 11, at Article XI(d) (‘obligation to respect the 
laws and regulations of the assisted state’). Likewise, there is a similarity between the ASEAN Agreement, 
supra note 14, at Article 13(2) (‘respect and abide by all national laws and regulations’) and the SAARC 
Agreement, supra note 14, at Article X(1)(b) (‘respect and abide by all national laws and regulations of the 
Requesting Party’).  
105 See further Fisher, ‘Domestic Regulation of International Humanitarian Relief in Disasters and Armed 
Conflict: A Comparative Analysis’, 89 IRRC (2007) 345. 
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back to the 1860s, with important conventions adopted in 1949 and 1977; and a developed 
body of customary international humanitarian law also in existence.106 These conventions and 
customary rules, together with other instruments, regulate the issues identified above as 
arising during armed conflicts. For example, there are detailed rules relating to the protection 
of the wounded and sick,107 the treatment of the dead,108 and the provision of humanitarian 
assistance.109   
In light of the similarity of issues that arise in armed conflicts and in disasters, and given that 
IHL is far more developed than the law relating to disaster relief, the ILC analogizes to IHL 
in identifying and formulating its draft Articles. Indeed, the Special Rapporteur of the ILC on 
the protection of persons in the event of disasters has variously described IHL as a ‘source’ of 
disaster relief law, a ‘useful[] guide’ in the development of disaster relief law, and as 
containing rules that can be ‘applied by analogy’ to disaster relief law.110 And the reports of 
the Special Rapporteur make frequent use of IHL.111  
The IFRC also refers to IHL in drawing up its Guidelines, albeit to a lesser extent. It 
considers certain of the guidelines to be ‘consistent with’ IHL and others to be analogous to 
it.112 It also draws on IHL provisions in addressing similar concerns that arise during 
disasters.113 Elsewhere, the IFRC has noted that ‘it is instructive to look to IHL by way of 
analogy where it addresses the same issues confronted by IDRL, particularly in light of the 
fact that some of the origins of IDRL can be traced to the rise of IHL.’114 
                                                          
106 Geneva Conventions 1949; Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions 1977; J.-M. Henckaerts and L. 
Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 2 vols (2005). 
107 E.g. Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field (First Geneva Convention), at Article 12; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol I), at 
Article 11; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol II), at Article 7; Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (CIHL), Rules 109-111. 
108 E.g. Article 17, First Geneva Convention; Article 34, Additional Protocol I; Article 8, Additional Protocol II; 
Rules 112-116, CIHL. 
109 E.g. Article 70, Additional Protocol I; Article 18, Additional Protocol II; Rules 55-56 CIHL. 
110 Preliminary report of the ILC Special Rapporteur, supra note 65, at paras 20, 20, and 24. 
111 See, e.g., the frequent invocations in the Fourth report of the ILC Special Rapporteur, supra note 71. 
112 Annotations to the Draft Guidelines, supra note 50, at 14 and 30. 
113 Ibid, at 17. 
114 IFRC Desk Study, supra note 2, at 36. 
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2. Use of Analogy in International Law 
Analogy is another common technique in the development of international law. It is used 
primarily to fill gaps in the relevant body of law. In the context of IHL, for example, in which 
the law of non-international armed conflict was far less developed than the law relating to 
international armed conflicts, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
developed the customary IHL applicable in non-international armed conflict by reference to 
the IHL applicable in international armed conflict.115 It observed that ‘What is inhumane, and 
consequently proscribed, in international wars, cannot but be inhumane and inadmissible in 
civil strife.116 Likewise, the International Committee of the Red Cross identified the 
customary IHL applicable in non-international armed conflict largely by drawing on that 
which was applicable in international armed conflict.117  
Use of analogy is by no means limited to international humanitarian law. In drawing up the 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the drafters analogized in certain places to 
refugee law.118 The Annotations to the Guiding Principles note explicitly that ‘refugee law, 
by analogy, can be useful to a certain extent in proposing rules and establishing guidelines to 
protect the needs of the internally displaced.’119 Analogy to refugee law and to human rights 
law was used, in particular, in formulating a right of internally displaced persons ‘to be 
protected against forcible return to or resettlement in any place where their life, safety, liberty 
or health would be at risk’.120 Prior to the Guiding Principles, the prohibition of refoulement 
applied only in the context of refugee law,121 and with respect to certain human rights.122 
Through use of analogy, the prohibition is extended in the Principles to internally displaced 
persons, to a broader range of rights, and also in respect of armed groups. 
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However, it is also crucial to take into account the differences between the two bodies of law. 
Accordingly, the Annotations go on to note:    
Nevertheless, one must take into account that, by definition, refugees are not 
citizens of the host country, whereas internally displaced persons remain in their 
own country. As many of the norms and guidelines relating to the status of 
refugees guarantee refugees equal treatment only with aliens in the country of 
refuge, an analogous application of these provisions would deprive many internally 
displaced persons of the rights they have as citizens of their own country and 
would thus be detrimental to the interests of such persons.123  
It might be suggested that, in both international humanitarian law, and in the context of the 
Guiding Principles, the law could be developed by analogy because an analogy was being 
drawn from within the same broad subject area. That is true to a certain extent, but it also 
accepts that analogies can be used. The issue becomes not whether the law can be developed 
by analogy but in what circumstances it is appropriate to do so.  
Furthermore, in other areas of the law, for example in the field of international investment 
law, analogies are drawn from a far broader range of subject areas.124 Arbitral tribunals have 
analogized inter alia to general public international law in analyzing the meaning of 
necessity;125 to international trade law in interpreting the standard of no less favourable 
treatment in like circumstances;126 to human rights law in understanding the right to a 
court;127 and to a combination of comparative public law, EU law, European human rights 
law, and public international law in giving content to the concept of legitimate 
expectations.128 Analogies are also made at the structural level.129  
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Analogy is also used as a technique in general international law. In the jurisdictional phase of 
the Nicaragua case, for example, the ICJ had to consider whether an optional clause 
declaration could be terminated with immediate effect. There being no established rules on 
point, it held that ‘[i]t appears from the requirements of good faith that they should be treated, 
by analogy, according to the law of treaties’.130 The ILC, in its Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of International Organizations, largely based its approach on analogy to the 
Articles on State Responsibility.131 And many more examples could be given.132  
Possible analogies have also been rejected. For example, in the Barcelona Traction case, the 
ICJ rejected any analogy to ‘the issues raised or the decision given’ in the Nottebohm case.133 
In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, in considering the rules relating to the delimitation 
of continental shelf areas between adjacent states, the ICJ rejected analogy to the rules 
regulating delimitation of adjacent territorial waters.134 Again, then, the question is more 
whether a particular analogy is appropriate in the circumstances at hand rather than whether 
analogy is a legitimate technique of law-making. 
These examples, from different fields of international law are contemporary in their nature. 
However, use of analogy is not new. Lauterpacht identified the use of analogy to private law 
sources in the field of public international law.135 Indeed, at one level, the very idea that 
general principles of national law can be used by international courts and tribunals is to 
engage in the use of analogy. Of note, today, is the fact that, analogies tend to be drawn from 
within public international law rather than from domestic law. This may be due to the 
requirement that the two situations at issue – the one under consideration and the one to 
which reference is being made – must be similar, and the greater similarity between the 
various sub-fields of public international law than between one such sub-field and domestic 
law. It also suggests the maturation of international law as compared to 1927, when 
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Lauterpacht published his influential work, although the point was urged by Lauterpacht 
himself.136 
In many respects, resort to analogy should be unsurprising. If a gap is identified in the law, it 
will likely be seen as more appropriate to rely on an equivalent rule or a related 
understanding in a different body of law rather than it to draw up a rule from scratch. The 
entity using the analogy is not ‘inventing’ the law; rather, it is suggesting that a general rule is 
applicable to the matter before it. An ‘argument by analogy is in effect an argument that 
specific rules reflect a broader (and often unstated) principle which is applicable not only to 
the circumstances governed by the specific rules but also to analogous circumstances.’137   
3. Limits of Analogy 
As indicated above, an analogy can only be drawn where the relevant situations are similar. 
In certain respects, disasters are very different from armed conflicts and it is not necessarily 
the case that the particular rule that exists in IHL will be appropriate for disaster relief law.138  
There are fundamental differences between situations of disaster and situations of armed 
conflict that might make analogy between the two inappropriate. The political considerations 
and operational environment differ significantly as between conflicts and disasters.139 In 
particular, in armed conflicts, but not in disasters, there are two warring parties – states and/or 
armed groups. These parties to the conflict are often concerned that the provision of 
humanitarian assistance will be diverted to fighters or combatants, or will otherwise assist the 
other side. As such, they often seek to exert tight control over the content and distribution of 
humanitarian assistance. The same is less true of situations of disaster. 
The absence of hostilities in situations of disaster also means that there is no need to balance 
ideas of humanity with those of military necessity, as is the case with IHL. This is not to 
suggest that humanity is the sole feature of situations of disaster; other principles, such as 
state sovereignty, will have to be taken into account. Nonetheless, the context of a disaster is 
ultimately very different from that of an armed conflict, even if the issues raised in both are 
similar.  
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This means that IHL can be looked to for guidance on how issues are treated. However, the 
IHL rule should not simply be ‘copied and pasted’ into an international law of disaster relief. 
The substantive rule should be closely analyzed to see if it is the best fit, for example, how it 
balances humanity with military necessity and whether that balance is appropriate also for 
application to disasters, or whether another rule is better.  
Even if the IHL rule is considered the most appropriate rule for the law of disaster relief, the 
detail or interpretation of that rule might be rather different. For example, in IHL, there is an 
obligation ‘to allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage’ of humanitarian 
assistance.140 A rule to similar effect can be found in the ILC’s draft Articles, with draft 
Article 15(1) providing for an obligation of the affected state to ‘take the necessary measures, 
within its national law, to facilitate the prompt and effective provision’ of humanitarian 
assistance. What constitutes ‘rapid’ or ‘prompt’ provision of relief will differ as between an 
armed conflict and a disaster. Likewise, whereas in both armed conflicts and disasters, a state 
might inspect the humanitarian assistance to be provided, the reasons for doing so, and the 
corresponding time it takes to do so will likely differ in the two situations.  
As with the development of the generalized standard, this is not to suggest that all uses of 
analogy to IHL in the development of the law relating to disaster relief are improper, or that 
all uses by the ILC or IFRC are inappropriate. Certain standards, such as the prohibition on 
the arbitrary withholding of consent to external humanitarian assistance, might well be 
correct, even if for different reasons.141 However, resort to analogy might be inappropriate if 
the contexts are sufficiently different or if the standard to be used is not the most appropriate.  
Indeed, it is one thing for a court or tribunal to develop the law by way of analogy and 
another thing for the ILC or IFRC to do so. The mandate of courts and tribunals is to decide 
disputes that are submitted to them.142 By contrast, the role of the ILC is to codify and 
progressively develop the law;143 and, in the present context, the IFRC was requested inter 
alia to ‘develop[] … models, tools and guidelines for practical use in international disaster 
response activities.’144 The different mandates of the bodies impose different constraints on 
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the actors. Adjudication has been described as the ‘natural habitat’ of reasoning by 
analogy.145 The same is not true of non-judicial bodies. Whether the technique of analogy is 
appropriate in particular cases for the ILC will depend inter alia on the extent to which the 
output is closer to codification or progressive development. It has been suggested, for 
example, that ‘[a]n objection that can be made to the carrying out of codification projects on 
the basis of analogy is that the topic may not be ripe for codification if practice and precedent 
is scant’ and that whether the ILC should instead ‘wait for practice and precedent to emerge 
is a delicate question involving a political judgment of the appropriateness and desirability of 
a codification of the subject matter at stake.’146  
The matter is different still for the IFRC. Insofar as the IFRC is concerned, it has scope to be 
inventive in a way that courts and tribunals, and even the ILC, does not, not least because it 
was requested to develop tools for practical use.147 Accordingly, a different solution to the 
one that already exists in another area of the law might very well prove more appropriate. 
Analogies should not always be the default position insofar as development of the law is 
concerned.  
C. Form, Substance, and Authority 
1. International Law of Disaster Relief 
The form that disaster relief instruments take is also of importance given that the form of an 
instrument can affect its authority.148 The international law relating to disaster relief is 
emerging as a holistic body of law through the conclusion of instruments which, while soft in 
form, contain a mixture of lex lata and lex ferenda.149 A state cannot simply violate a norm 
contained in an instrument by virtue of its soft form. This is not because the instrument itself 
is binding on the state. Rather, it is because the instrument contains norms that are binding on 
states outside the context of that instrument, for example, because the norm is one of 
customary international law or because the norm is also contained in a treaty to which the 
state is party. 
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The mix of lex lata and lex ferenda in instruments that are soft form is particularly apparent 
in the IFRC Guidelines. As noted above, the IFRC Guidelines note expressly that they are not 
binding.150 However, the Annotations to the Guidelines observe that the Guidelines ‘draw[] 
on existing international norms’ and ‘many of the provisions restate elements from existing 
binding international law.’151 As a result, the Guidelines contain a mix of binding obligations 
and normative aspirations but in soft form.  
The same is true of the ILC’s draft Articles. The ILC Secretariat considered that the ILC’s 
work in this regard would be ‘primarily limited’ to codification of existing law, with 
progressive development ‘as appropriate’.152 For his part, the ILC Special Rapporteur noted 
that ‘given the amorphous state of the law … striking the appropriate balance between lex 
lata and lex ferenda poses a singular challenge.’153  
2. Form, Substance, and Authority in International Law 
The conclusion of an instrument, which is soft in form but which contains provisions that are 
lex lata and lex ferenda, is not uncommon in general public international law or its sub-
fields.154  
In the instances in which the ILC drafts Articles on a particular topic, it tends not to specify 
whether a particular provision is one of codification or progressive development. Rather, 
what is adopted is an instrument that is soft in form but which comprises some provisions that 
are lex lata and others that are lex ferenda.  The instrument has ‘the look and feel’155 of a 
treaty. It is drafted as if it were a treaty, with Articles or provisions, using the language of 
obligation, and with a commentary, but remains soft in form.  
The ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility are a good example of this phenomenon. The 
Articles are part codification and part progressive development,156 and it is usually not 
apparent which parts are codification and which are progressive development.157 Only rarely 
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does the Commentary to the Articles refer to a particular Article as an instance of progressive 
development.158 The failure to distinguish between the codification aspects of the Articles 
and the progressive development aspects of the Articles has been criticised by some.159 
However, for present purposes, it is an observation rather than a criticism; indeed, it appears 
to be a standard technique of international law-making. Neither the soft form nor the mixed 
hard and soft content of the Articles has had a negative impact on the influence of the 
Articles. The Articles have been cited innumerable times by international, regional, and 
domestic courts.160 Indeed, even prior to the adoption of the Articles, the draft Articles had 
been cited with approval by courts and tribunals, including the ICJ.161  
Subsequent to the conclusion of its work on a particular topic, the ILC recommends a 
particular course of action to its parent body, the General Assembly. This ranges from taking 
‘no action, the report having already been published’ to convening a diplomatic conference 
for the preparation of a treaty on the subject.162 In respect of the Articles on State 
Responsibility, there was considerable debate within the ILC on the recommendation to be 
made. Some members expressed a preference for recommending the conclusion of a 
convention or the convening of a diplomatic conference, whilst others opted for the General 
Assembly taking note of, or adopting, the Articles.163 Following debate, the ILC eventually 
recommended that the General Assembly take note of the draft Articles in a resolution, set 
out the draft Articles in an annex to the resolution, and consider the adoption of a convention 
at a later stage.164 Mixed views on the subject were also expressed in the Sixth Committee.165 
The General Assembly eventually took note of the Articles, which were annexed to the 
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resolution, and ‘commend[ed] them to the attention of Governments without prejudice to the 
question of their future adoption or other appropriate action’.166   
Of particular interest for present purposes is the reason why a significant number of states 
and members of the ILC preferred to leave the Articles in soft form. This was not because 
they did not want the Articles to have an enhanced normative weight, but because the Articles 
were considered to have greater weight if they remained in soft form than if it were 
attempted to embody the Articles in a treaty.167 If a diplomatic conference were convened, a 
number of states were concerned that debates about various Articles would be reopened and 
there was no certainty that agreement would be reached and a convention adopted.168 Indeed, 
some states advocated for the convening of a diplomatic conference precisely in order that 
changes could be made to certain Articles.169 Even if a convention were adopted, there would 
be no guarantee that it would be widely ratified. More broadly, the failure to conclude a treaty 
on the subject would weaken the status of the Articles, as it would demonstrate a lack of 
consensus on the law. Accordingly, the soft form was preferred due to its likely accruing a 
progressively harder status over time, as states and courts and tribunals increasingly cited the 
draft Articles.170  
Over time, things have changed, and a significant number of states have indicated that they 
would be in favour of convening a diplomatic conference.171 Several reasons have been put 
forward in favour of such an approach. Of particular relevance for present purposes is that 
treaties are considered to have a greater authority than soft law instruments and thus provide 
legal certainty and have a stabilising effect on the law.172 Furthermore, some states have 
concluded that the Articles have been embedded sufficiently in state practice and the 
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jurisprudence of courts and tribunals as to allow for a convention to be elaborated on the 
basis of the Articles.173  
Whether to convert the Articles into a treaty also raises the broader issue of who makes 
international law. The ILC was originally envisaged as an initiator of law-making, with the 
final decision being left to states. However, by continuously deferring a decision on whether 
or not to convene a diplomatic conference, the ILC is transformed into the finalizer of law-
making.174 This has a knock-on effect for the role of states in the making of international law. 
All this being said, there are a number of aspects of the Articles that make them a special 
case. They were adopted by the ILC, which has a mandate to codify and progressively 
develop the law.175 They were used by courts and tribunals even prior to adoption on its 
second reading.176 The possibility of convening a diplomatic conference was left open but 
postponed.177 The General Assembly set out the Articles in an annex to its resolution, an 
approach which had previously been limited to texts that had been negotiated and adopted by 
the General Assembly, giving the Articles a greater weight.178 The General Assembly also 
commended the Articles to the attention of Governments, which, on one view was an 
invitation to ‘law-applying organs, and that includes individual States attempting to resolve a 
dispute in which issues of State responsibility are relevant, to look to the draft articles as a 
statement of the law on the matter.’179 Nonetheless, it remains the case that the Articles were 
considered to have greater authority if they were kept in soft form than if attempts were made 
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to translate them into conventional law. It has therefore been described as a paradox between 
form and authority.180  
The second example is the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. The Guiding 
Principles were drafted following a request by the UN Commission on Human Rights to the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons to develop 
‘an appropriate framework’ relating to the protection of the internally displaced.181 The 
Guiding Principles cover all aspects of the displacement cycle – protection from 
displacement, protection during displacement, as well as the post-displacement phase. 
According to the Annotations to the Guiding Principles, the Principles ‘reflect and are 
consistent with international human rights law and international humanitarian law and to a 
large extent thus codify and make explicit guarantees protecting internally displaced persons 
that are inherent in these bodies of law.’182 This careful framing of the Principles’ 
contribution should not obscure the fact that the Guiding Principles do advance the law in a 
number of respects.183 Indeed, were it not for areas of uncertainty, the Guiding Principles 
would not have been needed.  
The Compilation and Analysis of Legal Norms which preceded the Principles identified gaps 
in legal protection both in terms of the lack of ‘explicit norms … to address identifiable needs 
of the displaced’ and in terms of the existence of a general norm but the absence of a ‘more 
specific right … that would ensure implementation of the general norm in areas of particular 
need to internally displaced persons’.184 In certain respects, the Principles do advance existing 
law. For example, one Principle provides for ‘[t]he right [of IDPs] to be protected against 
forcible return to or resettlement in any place where their life, safety, liberty or health would 
be at risk’.185 As discussed above, the Principle thus extends traditional understandings of 
non-refoulement, which prior to the Principles applied only to cross-border transfers and to 
states, to apply to situations of internal movement and to non-state armed groups. Indeed, one 
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commentator has queried whether the drafters ‘intentionally framed the Principles as a 
restatement of existing law but, at the same time, surreptitiously introduced new provisions 
derived from existing ones.’186 The Guiding Principles is thus another example of an 
instrument which is soft in form but contains a mixture of lex lata and lex ferenda.  
Much like the Articles on State Responsibility, the Guiding Principles were deliberately 
adopted as Principles and not in the form of a treaty due to the difficulties in concluding a 
treaty in the area.187 Nonetheless, the Guiding Principles have had a considerable effect on 
the behaviour of states. For example, the World Summit Outcome describes the Guiding 
Principles as an ‘important international framework for the protection of internally displaced 
persons’.188 At the regional level, inter-governmental organizations have considered the 
Guiding Principles to be a useful tool or framework and have encouraged their use and 
adoption.189 At the national level, domestic legislation of a number of states is based on the 
Guiding Principles.190 National courts have also referred to the Guiding Principles, with the 
Colombian Constitutional Court describing the Guiding Principles as ‘del cuerpo normativo 
supranacional’.191 The (Great Lakes) Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally 
Displaced Persons converts the Guiding Principles into hard law for states parties to the 
Protocol,192 annexing as it does the Guiding Principles to the Protocol. States parties to the 
Protocol also undertake to ‘adopt and implement’ the Guiding Principles, to ‘enact national 
legislation to domesticate fully’ the Principles, and even to use the Annotations to the 
Principles as ‘an authoritative source for interpreting the application of the Guiding 
Principles’.193  
3. Limits of the Technique 
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The development of instruments in the area of disaster relief, which are soft in form but 
which contain provisions that are lex lata as well as lex ferenda, are thus simply further 
examples of the use of the approach. Such instruments are created for a number of reasons. 
Many entities cannot create hard law, thus, out of necessity they are left with instruments that 
are soft in form.194 The mix of hard and soft norms also occurs because of the lack of strict 
distinction between codification and progressive development, because it is unclear whether a 
particular norm is, in fact, one of hard law or soft law,195 or due to a difference in opinion 
between the various drafters.  
Failing to distinguish between the two can also be a way in which to harden the soft law 
components. The soft law components can become hardened by virtue of their association 
with the hard law components. It is an incremental hardening over time; a hardening by 
osmosis. If 14 of 15 provisions in an instrument are reflective of customary international law, 
it will unlikely be long before the 15th provision is argued to be, then accepted as, custom.196 
However, much will depend on the subject matter at hand; the type of instrument; the degree 
of controversy surrounding the customary status of the provisions; and the proportion of soft 
norms to hard norms. The reverse is also true. The greater the proportion of progressive 
development, the longer it will take for the incremental hardening to take place. Indeed, too 
much by way of progressive development leads to the danger that the entire product will be 
considered non-binding, even those aspects that reflect custom. The balance between 
codification and progressive development in the framework is thus an important but delicate 
one.  
In the context of the ILC’s draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of 
Disasters, a few states expressed concerns about precisely this balance between lex lata and 
lex ferenda, taking the view that the draft Articles are too heavily weighted on the side of lex 
ferenda. For example, China remarked that ‘[t]he draft articles were regrettably short on lex 
lata and long on lex ferenda, some of them lacking the support of solid general State 
practice’.197 And Germany expressed the view that ‘[i]t was already an enormous challenge to 
                                                          
194 See Pronto, supra note 37. 
195 Preliminary Report of the ILC Special Rapporteur, supra note 65, at para. 59, noting that the Commission 
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collect and analyse existing practice in order to elucidate lex lata, so it would be wise for the 
Commission to refrain from developing new rules de lege ferenda which could only be highly 
controversial.’198  
The proportion of lex lata to lex ferenda is particularly important insofar as the draft Articles 
are concerned for two reasons. First, there is an abundance of soft law on disaster relief.199 
Thus, the added value of another instrument that is soft in form and contains a considerable 
amount of soft content is open to question. Indeed, in its observations on the draft Articles, 
adopted on first reading, the IFRC indicated that ‘there is little point in issuing the draft 
articles as non-binding guidelines’, as this would ‘risk significant confusion and overlap with 
existing “soft-law” documents’. By contrast, ‘[i]f the draft articles were adopted in the form 
of a framework treaty, they could have a positive impact on accelerating the development of 
more detailed national laws and procedures’ or stimulate law-making at the regional level.200 
Second, in situations in which there is uncertainty about a particular matter, or a ‘perceived 
insufficiency’ in hard law, an instrument in soft form can prove useful by virtue of its mere 
existence.201 As Caron puts it: ‘when there is a “legal vacuum” of authority relevant on an 
issue, courts and arbitral panels will turn to whatever is available’.202 The instrument can be 
used as a shortcut by an entity which needs an answer, rather than having to undertake the 
first hand research itself.203 Instruments in soft form, which contain a mix of lex lata and lex 
ferenda, work best when there is a body of hard law already in existence to which it can 
attach. Insofar as disaster relief law is concerned, this hard skeleton is largely missing. It is 
thus notable that the ILC recommended to the General Assembly that a convention be 
elaborated on the basis of the Draft Articles.204 And the General Assembly’s decision on the 
matter will have important consequences.205 
                                                          
198 Germany, in Sixth Committee, Summary Record of the Twenty-Third Meeting, A/C.6/66/SR.23, 14 
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Terminology is also important for the form/substance/authority nexus, as it can affect the 
manner in which the instrument is received and the extent to which it is used. The IFRC’s 
work is a case in point. As one of the IFRC’s instruments is entitled ‘Guidelines’, it gives the 
impression that it is entirely soft in content or that states can depart from it as they see fit. 
With this comes the danger that the hard components of the instrument are overlooked or 
become softer over time and that the instrument itself is ignored. It also explains, perhaps, 
why relatively few states have used the Guidelines in the development of their domestic 
law,206 and why the manner in which the Guidelines have influenced certain domestic 
legislation has been rather modest, with relatively little shaping of the overall content.  
There is a further aspect of the form/substance relationship that affects the authority of an 
instrument. As per its usual practice, the ILC left the decision as to the final form of the draft 
Articles until its work was completed.207 While understandable, the content of an instrument 
– the way in which it is written, the language that is used, the level of detail provided, even 
whether or not to include particular Articles – depends on its final form, for example, whether 
it is going to be a treaty or whether it is going to take another form such as guidelines. For 
example, if the form of an instrument is in the nature of guidelines, it would be more 
appropriate to use the language of ‘should’ rather than ‘shall’. The reverse is true if the 
instrument is to be in treaty form, with the language of obligation being used and only strictly 
legal provisions being included. In leaving the decision as to the final form until the work 
was completed, the ILC did not know whether it was drafting for a treaty or for guidelines. 
This, in turn, has the potential to lead to an uneasy fit between the substance of the Articles 
and the recommendation to the General Assembly as to its final form.  
More problematically, and perhaps inevitably with the move to a holistic body of law, the 
ILC’s draft Articles are at a relatively high degree of generality. However, in order for the 
international law of disaster relief to serve its intended purpose, namely, to facilitate the 
response to disasters in order to meet the essential needs of persons affected by disasters,208 
the body of law needs to be operational. This, in turn, means that there needs to be detailed 
rules on the specificities of the provision of assistance. For example, Article 15 of the draft 
Articles provides that: 
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‘The affected States shall take the necessary measures, within its national law, to facilitate 
the prompt and effective provision of external assistance, in particular regarding: 
(a) relief personnel, in fields such as privileges and immunities, visa and entry 
requirements, work permits, and freedom of movement; and  
(b) equipment and goods, in fields such as customs requirements and tariffs, taxation, 
transport, and the disposal thereof.’ 
 
Given the nature of the ILC’s draft Articles, all the ILC can say is that ‘the necessary 
measures’ must be taken. Little detail can be given on exactly what measures are to be taken. 
However, in order for relief to be provided in a timely manner, it is precisely this sort of 
detail that is needed. Otherwise, a disconnect emerges between the holistic body of law and 
the problems that arise during the relief phase following a disaster.209 The general rules need 
to operate alongside more specific guidance. 
 
4. Conclusion  
International disaster relief law started out as being comprised of a series of piecemeal 
instruments – disaster specific, assistance specific, and region specific. This was due to the 
demise of the IRU and the inability to conclude an overarching treaty on the subject at the 
global level. However, through a series of techniques, this piecemeal approach is in the 
process of being converted into a holistic body of law, both at the international level through 
the ILC’s draft Articles and at the national level through the IFRC’s Guidelines and Model 
Act. Both the work of the ILC and the work of the IFRC involve the identification and 
development of norms that apply to all disasters and in all regions of the world rather than to 
specific types of disaster, specific types of assistance, or specific regions. 
These techniques consist of (1) extrapolating from a series of regional, sub-regional, and 
bilateral treaties and disaster and assistance specific treaties, as well as a host of soft law 
instruments, in order to develop a generalized standard; and developing a model law on that 
same basis. It includes (2) analogizing to the more developed body of international 
humanitarian law. And it comprises (3) the drawing up of instruments that are soft in form 
but which contain lex lata as well as lex ferenda.  
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Although at first sight unorthodox, these techniques are in fact used rather frequently in the 
making and shaping of general public international law as well as in its various sub-fields, 
such as international humanitarian law and international investment law. Indeed, in many 
ways, they are simply ordinary techniques of international law-making.  
These techniques reveal further that international law-making is flexible and develops 
according to the needs of the international community.210 States, the International Red Cross 
and Red Crescent movement, and others have recognized the need to change the way in 
which international disaster relief is regulated. There has also been awareness of the 
importance of multilateral treaties as well as recognition of the difficulties associated with 
their conclusion. As a result, certain techniques have been utilized that stay as close as 
possible to the form and language of a treaty without actually constituting a treaty. These are 
the techniques of extrapolation and the development of model acts. Likewise, instruments 
have been developed, which ‘look and feel’ like a treaty,211 but which are soft in form. These 
instruments exhibit a normative pull whilst circumventing the difficulties associated with the 
conclusion of treaties. Through the uses of these techniques, international law has proven 
itself able to cater to particular problems in a creative manner. The way in which a holistic 
body of disaster relief law has emerged also reveals the considerable importance of actors 
such as the ILC and the IFRC and the central role that state-empowered entities play in the 
making and shaping of international law. International law is increasingly being made by 
entities other than states, in particular expert bodies. 
Particular uses of the techniques, however, are open to question. In order to create a 
generalized multilateral standard, there must be a sufficiency and consistency of instruments. 
Likewise, in order to properly analogize to a particular body of law, similarity of subject 
matter is insufficient. The context in which the norms apply is also important. Furthermore, 
analogy need not always be the ‘go to’ solution. Some entities have the mandate to be more 
creative in their design of the law. A technique that is used successfully in one area of the law 
will not always be the best technique to utilize in another area. Insofar as the form-substance-
authority nexus is concerned, for example, much will depend on the balance between the lex 
lata and the lex ferenda in any instrument.   
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More generally, the move towards a holistic body of law assumes that it is better than a 
patchwork of norms. The principal advantage of the approach is that it provides clarity on the 
rights and obligations of states and other actors and fills gaps that exist in the piecemeal 
approach. The rights and obligations are not contingent on which part of the world the 
disaster takes place, the type of disaster, the type of assistance, or the identity of the state 
seeking to provide assistance. There would also not be debate surrounding the hard or soft 
status of a particular norm. The holistic body approach thus systematizes matters and 
provides order to a rather messy area of the law.  
However, the holistic body approach carries with it some risks. It assumes the existence of a 
multilateral instrument at the global level to which there is universal agreement. Yet, there is 
no guarantee that a multilateral treaty at the global level can in fact be agreed. If it can be 
agreed, there is no certainty that it would regulate issues at the level of detail required, or that 
it would be widely ratified. Indeed, some of the regional and assistance-specific treaties on 
disaster relief have few states parties and some states decided not to ratify treaties, or 
concluded treaties with particular states, such as neighboring states, on specific types of 
disaster.212 If the instrument is not of a conventional character, disagreement might still arise 
relating to the legal nature of particularly norms. Failure to conclude a treaty also has broader 
consequences: ‘[a] failure undermines the power of previously-emerging patterns of 
principled conduct. The persuasiveness of an emerging norm increases every time states 
adhere to it. It diminishes when states, fearing that they may be bound by a written mandatory 
text, feel compelled to register their every reservation to each imaginable hypothetical 
scenario.’213 The holistic body approach might be to force order and uniformity in an area in 
which there is none.  
Ultimately, the extent to which the holistic body approach in general, and the techniques in 
particular, are accepted will depend on the extent to which states react to these techniques and 
how states respond to the emerging body of disaster relief law.  
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